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I. Introduction 
Multiple factors determine the decision of agents over where to live, work, 
and consume. Many individuals have a definite preference to live in a certain 
place, sometimes originated on personal experience or family history. Yet, by 
commuting, agents can separate their choice of place to live and work. 
Communities may have different endowment of resources determining the 
productivity of workers in the area. Also, government spending on 
infrastructure is an important factor in this respect. In general, infrastructure 
acts as a complementary input to labor, increasing its productive capacity. 
Furthermore, differential provision of local public goods across communities 
will influence the decision of agents for where to live. In summary, there are 
many factors interacting when agents are choosing a place to live and a 
workplace.  
The objective in this paper is twofold. First, we provide a simple 
framework and some theoretical discussions that are useful in a formal 
analysis of the aforementioned interactions. Our simple model delivers some 
important insights on the determinants of the geographic distribution of 
activity in the economy, and the complementary discussions help to create a 
more complete picture of the main issues. Second, we discuss how some of 
these localization forces come into place in the context of a specific economic 
area in Argentina: the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area.  
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a simple 
model that is suitable for the study of the determinants of the localization 
decision of agents. We also study the decision of agents with respect to 
whether or not to commute to another region for working purposes. 
Commuting costs, infrastructure and local public goods play a crucial role in 
our analysis. In the third section we discuss other factors that may play a 
significant role in the determination of the distribution of the population and 
the workforce across different regions of an economy. Section IV provides a 
short discussion of some of the issues raised by the preceding analysis in the 
context of a large urban area in Argentina. Finally, the last section contains 
some concluding remarks. 
II. A Simple Model 
Consider a simple model with two regions, 1 and 2 and a continuum of 
agents with measure N. Agents differ in their preference to live in region 1 or 
2, but are otherwise homogeneous. Each agent has an endowment of one unit 
of labor that they supply inelastically.  
Let Gi be the level of local public goods provided by the government in 
region i with i = 1, 2. In this model, the local public goods in region i represent 
the public amenities enjoyed by the people living in that region. Agents, then, 
consume and enjoy the place where they live, together with its public 
amenities. We denote by c the level of individual consumption. Formally, 
agent  preferences are represented by the following utility function: ],0[ Nn∈
 
),(),( 1 nNaGcu −+  
 
if agent n lives in region 1, and 
 
,),( 2 anGcu +  
 
if agent n lives in region 2.4  
The heterogeneity across agents is indexed by the parameter  in 
their utility functions. Individuals with a high value of n have a preference to 
live in region 2. The constant a indicates the importance workers give to their 
],0[ Nn∈
                                                 
4 Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski (1974), Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Wellisch 
(1994) are other studies where agents have heterogeneous preferences over locations. 
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place of residency; if a = 0 we say that there is “residential indifference.” 
Similarly, the bigger the value of a, the more important is the role of 
preferences in the localization decision. 
Wages in region i depend on the number of agents working in the region (li) 
and on the level of infrastructure provided by the government, which we 
denote by gi with i = 1, 2. Then, we have that wages in region i are given by wi 
(li ,gi ) and we assume that wi is a decreasing function of li and an increasing 
function of gi. These two assumptions are easily justified. Basically, they are 
meant to capture the standard assumption of decreasing marginal productivity 
of labor and the fact that infrastructure is a complementary input in 
production.5  
Agents, if they wish to do so, can live in one region and work in the other. 
Working in a different region than where the agent lives involves some 
commuting costs, which we summarize with the variable s. Consequently, the 
consumption of an agent that is working in region i is given by c = wi - I s, 
where the indicator variable I takes value one if the agent is commuting and 
value zero if the agent lives and works in the same region. 
 
Taxonomy of equilibrium outcomes 
We call equilibrium a situation where, given the distribution of workers and 
inhabitants in each region, no agent has an incentive to move to the other 
region or to go to work in the other region. There are many types of possible 
equilibrium outcomes. In particular, depending on the value of the parameters 
and the shape of the utility and wage functions we may have equilibriums 
where no agent commute and equilibriums where some agents commute.  
Before we start with our taxonomy, note that in the model there is an 
implicit tendency to symmetry. Specifically, if both regions have the same 
levels of (productive) infrastructure and local public goods and the same wage 
functions (productivity), then population will be split exactly in halves (half 
living in region 1 and half in region 2). In other words, the specific 
preference’s heterogeneity that we have assumed here will not be the driving 
                                                 
5 However, it should be mentioned here that in the literature on urban economics it is common 
to resort to increasing returns as the driving force for many agglomeration outcomes. In this 
section we stay away from these more complicated issues, which will be later discussed in 
section III. 
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force for the possible asymmetries among regions that the different 
equilibrium situations can have. 
 
Equilibrium without commuting 
There are two reasons for an equilibrium to exhibit no commuting. One 
possibility is that all agents choose to live and work in the region with high 
wages. The analysis of this case is fairly simple and we do not pursue it here.  
The other possibility is that some workers live and work in each region. Define 
the subset NNC of values of n as follows:  
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
<−−
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Also, let n* be the value of n that satisfies the following equation: 
 
*]),*,([*)(]),*,([ 222111 anGgnNwunNaGgnwu +−=−+  
 
Then, if  we have that there is an equilibrium where all agents with 
 live and work in region 1 and all agents with  live and work in 
region 2. No commuting takes place in this equilibrium. 
NCNn ∈*
*nn < *nn >
 
Equilibrium with commuting 
There are three possible types of equilibrium with commuting. To simplify 
the analysis we assume that region 2 is the region that is more likely to attract 
workers (there is a set of equivalent possible equilibriums that correspond to 
the equilibriums studied here after a re-labeling of the regions).6 Then, we 
have that the three types of equilibriums are: (i) all agents live in region 1 and 
some or all (commute and) work in region 2; (ii) some agents live in region 1 
and some in region 2 but all agents work in region 2; (iii) some agents live and 
                                                 
6 The objective here is to describe the different generic situations that can arise in equilibrium. 
For this purpose, we concentrate only in the cases where region 2 is the one most likely to attract 
workers. There are similar (symmetric) cases in which region 1 tends to attract more workers. A 
region may be attracting workers because the corresponding wage function for that region is 
higher (given the arguments of the function) or because the arguments of the function are higher 
for that region.  
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work in region 1, some live in region 1 and work in region 2, and some live 
and work in region 2. We study each case respectively. 
 
(i.a) Suppose the following two inequalities hold: 
 
),,0(),( 1122 gwsgNw >−  
 
.]),,([],),([ 222122 aNGgNwuGsgNwu +>−    
The first equation tells us that, even when all agents are working in region 
2, the wage in region 2, net of commuting cost, is higher than the wage in 
region 1. Then, all workers will prefer to work in region 2. The second 
equation tells us that even the agent with the highest value of n (that is, n = N) 
would prefer to live in region 1, and commute to region 2 to work (rather than 
living and working in region 2). Since all other agents have an even weaker 
preference for living in region 2, all agents will choose to live in region 1. 
Under this situation, commuting is maximized. All agents are commuting to 
work. 
 
(i.b) Suppose now that the following two equations hold:  
 
 
),*,()*,( 111222 glwsglw =−  
 
,]),*,([],)*,([ 22221222 aNGglwuGsglwu +>−  
 
then, all agents will live in region 1 but only l1 agents will work in region 1 and 
the rest (l2* = N – l1*) will live in region 1 but commute and work in region 2. 
We can think of these two cases as representing the case where region 1 is a 
residential area and region 2 is an industrial area. The first case (i.a) 
corresponds to the case of “specialized” regions; one region is exclusively 
residential and the other is exclusively industrial. The second case, instead, 
have some agents working in the residential area, perhaps providing certain 
specific (house-life related) services to the residents of that region. This kind 
of scenario is more likely if the provision of public goods is very uneven; that 
is, if G1 is much larger than G2. 
 
 
ECONÓMICA 20 
(ii) This second case corresponds to a situation where both regions have 
residential space but region 2 is the region where all agents work. The 
following two equations characterize the equilibrium: 
 
),,0(),( 1122 gwsgNw >−  
 
*,]),,([*)(],),([ 222122 anGgNwunNaGsgNwu +=−+−  
 
where n* is the measure of agents living in region 1. Under this scenario, all 
agents living in region 1 are also commuting, hence n* is also the measure of 
agents commuting in equilibrium. On the other side, N - n* agents live and 
work in region 2; that is, they do not commute. 
This case is most likely when the provision of local public goods is fairly 
even across regions (that is, G1 > G2), but the level of infrastructure 
(complementary to production) is significantly better developed in one of the 
regions (in this case, region 2; that is, g2 > g1). 
The analysis of these special cases allows us to highlight an issue that has 
been ignored in the model being considered. Suppose that agents consume in 
the region where they live. Then, in those equilibriums where no people live in 
region 2 but some people work in it, all the goods produced in region 2 will be 
exported to region 1. Clearly, this kind of unrealistic situation stresses the 
importance of studying the role of transport cost for good and its implication 
over the decisions of agents with respect to where they consume. In particular, 
note that some agents may be living in region 1 and working in region 2. 
Hence, without any extra costs, these agents could easily shift their 
consumption spending across regions in search for, for example, better prices 
(net of transport cost and presumably adjusted for quality).  
 
(iii) The final case that we need to consider is characterized by the following 
two equations: 
 
),*,()*,( 111222 glwsglw =−  
 
.*]),*,([*)(],)*,([ 22221222 anGglwunNaGsglwu +=−+−  
 
Replacing l2* = N - l1* we have that this is a system of two equations in 
two unknowns, l1* and n*. We assume that the solution to the system of 
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equations is such that l1* < n* (otherwise, there would be no commuting in 
equilibrium).  
In this case, there are agents living and working in each region but some of 
the agents living in region 1 commute and work in region 2. In particular, we 
have that l1* agents live and work in region 1, n* - l1* agents live in region 1 
and commute to work in region 2, and l2* = N - l1* agents live and work in 
region 2. Figure 1 illustrates the determination of the distribution of workers in 
this scenario. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
In principle, we can argue that this case is the most relevant one. Usually 
regions have some agents working and some agents living in them. 
Furthermore, some commuting is likely to be observed among neighboring 
regions. One limitation of the model is that, because of the homogeneity of 
workers and jobs, we are not able to capture situations where there is two-way 
commuting, which is also a fairly common phenomenon. 
 
Comparative statics 
We have argued that the type (iii) equilibrium is the most interesting case. 
For this reason, in what follows, we concentrate our attention on this 
equilibrium. We want to determine now how the distribution of workers and 
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households across regions would vary when the fiscal and commuting 
parameters vary.  
Recall that the equilibrium values of l1* and n* are given by the solution to 
the following system of equation: 
 
),*,()*,( 111212 glwsglNw =−−    (1) 
 
.*]),*,([*)(],)*,([ 22121212 anGglNwunNaGsglNwu +−=−+−−  (2) 
 
 
In principle we could use Cramer’s rule to analyze the comparative statics 
of this system. However, there is an even simpler way to proceed that 
originates on the recursive nature of the system. In particular, note that the 
value of l1* is determined uniquely by equation (1). Then, taking the total 
differential of equation (1), and rearranging terms, we get that: 
 
.0*,0*,0*
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The first result tells us that when the commuting costs increases, more 
workers will choose to work in region 1 and avoid commuting. The second 
result captures the idea that improvements in (production) infrastructure in 
region 1 will tend to increase wages in that region and hence the number of 
agents working in that region. Finally, the third result tells us that, if region 2 
improves its (production) infrastructure (ceteris paribus), then more workers 
will choose to work in that region. 
Now, taking total differential of equation (2), we obtain that: 
 
.0),(
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These two results tell us that when a region increases its provision of local 
public goods the resulting improve in living amenities tends to induce agents 
to move to that region.  
Determining how the proportion of the population living in region 1 
depends on the commuting cost is slightly more complicated. The reason is 
that now some indirect effects come into place. As we saw before, when the 
commuting cost s changes the distribution of workers across regions also 
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changes. This change, in turn, influences the equilibrium wages that then 
influence the localization decision of agents. To obtain this result formally, 
first note that: 
 
.01*1
2
2 >+
ds
dl
dl
dw
 
 
Then, taking total differential of (2) we have that: 
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This expression implies that an increase in the commuting cost will derive 
in a decrease in the number of agents living in region 1. The intuition behind 
this result is that when there is an increase in the cost associated with living in 
one region and commuting to work in the other, some agents will actually 
decide to move their household to the region where they work. In this way, 
agents will compromise their preference for living in the region of their liking, 
just to avoid incurring what is now a higher commuting cost. 
Finally, we can also study how the proportion of agents living in each 
region will change as a response to an increase in the (production) 
infrastructure of one of the regions. Note that this change will originate 
completely on indirect effects, through the changes induced in wages and the 
distribution of workers. As before, first note that 
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Then, we have that 
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The sign of these expressions depends on the sign of the difference in 
marginal utility of consumption in the two regions. Note that c1 = w2 – s < c2 = 
w2, and decreasing marginal utility of consumption implies that, if G1 is not too 
different from G2, the size of the population living in region 1 will increase 
when the level of (productive) infrastructure increases in either of the two 
regions (that is, dn*/dg1 > 0 and dn*/dg2 > 0). 
Developing an intuition for this result requires some effort. It may appear 
somewhat surprising at first that improvements in productive infrastructure in 
either of the two regions produce the same effect on the distribution of 
inhabitants. The general idea behind this result is as follows. Government 
spending in (productive) infrastructure induces workers to go to work in the 
region where the new infrastructure is located. However, wage equalization 
(equation 1) requires that the return to labor increases in both regions. The 
wage increase is valued more by those living in region 1 and this (relative) 
increase, in turn, drives an increase in the number of agents that wish to live in 
that region. 
 
n*0 n*'
U2
U1
nN  
Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the result. The lines U¹(n) and 
U²(n) depict the (across agents’ types n) utility of living in each region. With 
the same increase in wages in both regions (equation 1) and assuming that the 
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marginal utility of consumption is greater in region 1 (where consumption was 
lower because of the commuting costs), the utility of living in region 1 
increases more than that of living in region 2. Consequently, the line U¹ moves 
up more than U² and drives an increase in the equilibrium value of n, the size 
of the population living in region 1. 
 
Some extensions 
Consumption prices: We can extend the analysis to include different prices 
for private goods in each region. Assume, for simplicity, that agents consume 
in the place where they live and that the price differential comes from an 
overcharge per unit bought by consumers (with no differential at the 
production level). Then, the price paid by the residents and consumers of 
region 2 is p2 = 1 + t = p, while we still assume that p1 = 1 in region 1. In this 
case, we have c2 = w2 / p, for the agents that live and work in region 2; and c1 = 
w1 (= w2 – s, in equilibrium) for the agents that live and work in region 1 and 
the agents that live in region 1 and commute to work in region 2.7
We now have that the equilibrium is described by the following two 
equations: 
 
),*,()*,( 111222 glwsglw =−  
 
.*],/)*,([*)(],)*,([ 22221222 anGpglwunNaGsglwu +=−+−  
 
First note that the distribution of workers across regions is independent of 
p. The change in n* as p changes, is given by: 
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This result tell us that if agents consume where they live and the price of 
consumption goods increases in region 2, then agents will tend to move to live 
in region 1. 
 
                                                 
7 If agents could choose between consuming in the place where they live or in the place where 
they work, then differences among the price of consumption goods across regions would add 
new factors influencing the decision of whether to move or commute.  
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Mixed public goods: Consider now the case when it is not possible to 
separate (productive) infrastructure from what constitutes just local public 
goods. This case corresponds to the plausible situation where local public 
goods not only influence the utility of agents living in the region but also 
improve the infrastructure available in the region. We call these public goods 
“mixed.” To capture this idea we assume that dGi /dgi, with i = 1, 2, is not 
equal to zero.8
The comparative static results are now a combination of the ones obtained 
in the previous section. For example, we have 
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The sign of this derivative is ambiguous because the direct effect of an 
increase in infrastructure is counterbalanced by the indirect effect of the 
increase in the level of local public goods in region 2. However, it is not hard 
to show that increases in g1 result in increases in n*, as in this case the direct 
effect of the increase in g1 and the indirect effect, through the induced increase 
in G1, both go in the same direction (no compensation takes place). 
 
Housing costs: An important factor in the analysis of localization decisions 
is, of course, the cost of housing. An important component of the housing 
costs is the rent on urban land. We now make some specific assumptions that 
allow us to capture these issues in a very simple way.  
Assume that each individual has to consume one unit of housing and that 
there is a limited number of houses K in region 2, with K < N. Also assume 
that the number of available houses (or land) in region 1 is unlimited. If houses 
in a region can only be used as residence for those agents living in that region, 
then the price of housing in region 1 will be always zero and the price of 
housing in region 2 may be positive.  
                                                 
8 Examples of pure “residential” public goods that would only increase the variable G in our 
model are public playgrounds, a zoo, or a recreational area. An industrial park would be an 
example of a public project that would (in principle) only increase the value of our variable g. 
But most public projects, like roads, street lights, policing, and others, would tend to increase 
both G and g and hence would enter our categorization as “mixed” public goods. 
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Call r ≥ 0 the price of a house in region 2 and n* the solution to equation 
(2) in the previous section. Then, if N – n* < K we have that r = 0, and the 
distribution of households living in each region is the same as the one we 
obtained in the previous section (that is, n* agents live in region 1 and N – n* 
live in region 2). But, if N-n* > K, then only K agents will live in region 2 and 
the price of houses in region 2 will be positive, that is r > 0. The equilibrium 
value of r is determined by the following equation: 
 
 
).(],)*,([],)*,([ 22121212 KNaGrglNwuaKGsglNwu −+−−=+−−  
 
 
It is interesting to evaluate the comparative statics with respect to G2 under 
this modified environment. Clearly, an increase in G2 cannot increase the size 
of the population living in region 2, which is already equal to the upper bound 
K. In fact, the change in G2 will only increase the level of rent r on urban land. 
Also note that the utility level obtained by the agents living in region 2 does 
not change when G2 changes. In other words, improvements in the provision 
of local public goods in region 2 will not result in improvements on the 
welfare of agents living in that region. Increases in G2 will only increase the 
rent of the owners of the urban land. 
 
A transition scenario 
In our taxonomy of equilibrium we studied situations where no agent had 
incentives to either move or go to work to another region. These situations, if 
reached, would tend to persist in time. However, no attempt was made to 
explain how an economy would reach one or another equilibrium situation. 
Here we provide one possible transition scenario for an economy that may be 
regarded as having some empirical relevance.  
We study a situation where an economy experiences a transition from a no 
commuting equilibrium to one where commuting happens. Basically, we start 
with a situation where commuting cost are prohibitively high and move to a 
situation where these costs become lower and some agents start to take 
advantage of the possibility of commuting. 
Let sH and sL be two values of the commuting cost; with sH > sL. Consider 
now an economy that satisfies the following inequalities: 
 
,)*,()*,( 1122 HHHL sgnwgnNws <−−<  
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where nH* is such that, 
 
.*]),*,([*)(]),*,([ 222111 HHHH anGgnNwunNaGgnwu +−=−+  
 
Suppose first that the commuting cost is sH. Then, the equilibrium of the 
economy is such that nH* agents are living and working in region 1 and N- nH* 
agents are living and working in region 2. No commuting takes place in this 
equilibrium. 
Now suppose that the commuting cost falls to sL. When this change 
happens, some agents that were living and working in region 1 will start 
commuting to region 2, as  
 
).*,()*,( 1122 gnwsgnNw HLH >−−  
 
The new equilibrium will have lL* agents working in region 1, with       lL*< 
nH* (and N - lL* working in region 2), such that: 
 
).*,()*,( 1122 glwsglNw LLL =−−  
 
Also, the new equilibrium will have nL* agents living in region 1 (and       N 
- nL* living in region 2), with nL* being the solution to: 
 
.*]),*,([*)(]),*,([ 222111 LLLL anGglNwunNaGglwu +−=−+  
 
It is then easy to show that nL* > nH*, so that, while more people go to 
work to region 2, more people move to live in region 1. We can think of this 
result as reflecting the fact that, when commuting costs were high, some 
agents were living in region 2 mainly to be able to work there without having 
to commute. Once commuting costs decrease, these agents relocate to region 1 
and commute to work in region 2. 
If we interpret region 1 as being the suburbs of the city and region 2 as the 
center of the city, this change in commuting costs provides an interest example 
of a process of suburbanization. Basically, the response to a decrease in the 
cost of commuting is a flow of people that move to live in the suburbs (region 
1) and an increase in the number of commuters that live in the suburbs and 
work in the city (region 2). 
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III. Other theoretical considerations 
The simple model presented in the previous section abstracts from a 
number of important factors that are relevant in the localization decision of 
workers and households. Many of these factors have been extensively studied 
in the urban economics literature. In this section we provide a summary 
discussion of the main insights resulting from these studies. While the 
motivation for most of the work in this area originates in developments 
occurring in the US economy, it will become clear that, in many instances, the 
ideas are applicable to understanding the trends on localization outcomes in 
Argentina. 
 
Agglomeration economies 
Why is economic activity concentrated in a relatively small number of 
geographic areas? Many factors have been pointed out by economists to 
explain this observation. Among these, agglomeration economies definitely 
play an important role. Agglomeration economies refer to the advantages that 
proximity has on economic activity. As a result of these advantages, industries 
and households have an incentive to form clusters, which eventually develop 
into cities. 
Duranton and Puga (2004) provide a detailed description of the 
microfoundations behind the idea of agglomeration economies. They 
distinguish three types of mechanisms that generate increasing returns at the 
local level: sharing, matching, and knowledge spillovers. The first one 
suggests that the concentration of economic activity gives rise to external 
benefits that can be shared among firms and households located in the cluster. 
For instance, agglomeration economies occur when individuals share an 
indivisible facility. Under these conditions, average costs decline as the 
community gets bigger. At the same time, however, the facility will be subject 
to increasing crowding and congestion. Thus, the optimal size of a city can be 
regarded as the result of a tradeoff between agglomeration economies and 
urban crowding. Another instance of a productive advantage that can be shared 
among firms located in large clusters is the benefits from access to a wider 
variety of input suppliers. 
The second mechanism is based on the fact that urban agglomerations 
improve the quality of matches available to firms and the total probability of 
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matching. The inputs in these matches may include workers, intermediate 
inputs, or even ideas. Furthermore, location in large cities can help to 
ameliorate the exposure to potential hold-up problems. A hold-up problem 
arises when one party, engaged in a bilateral agreement with another, 
undertakes an ex-ante relationship-specific investment. Once the investment 
has taken place, the investor loses all bargaining power, or in other words, it 
can be held-up in a renegotiation stage. Obviously, this problem can be 
mitigated if the investor has the possibility of switching to an alternative 
partner. Agglomeration economies in cities would tend to make the hold-up 
problem less important, given that the number of potential partners is higher in 
large urban areas. Thus, cities would help mitigate the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior. As stated by Duranton and Puga (2004) “…asset 
specificity is likely to be less of an issue in an environment where the number 
of potential partners is large.” 
Finally, the third mechanism stresses how the geographic concentration of 
people and jobs in cities can stimulate the generation, diffusion, and 
accumulation of knowledge. 
 
Financing local public goods 
In principle, local governments should provide public goods as long as 
there are no significant interjurisdictional externalities. However, many local 
public goods do satisfy this basic requirement. For instance, citizens educated 
in one jurisdiction may later move to another creating an external benefit in the 
receiving area. Pollution control and the lack of thereof, on the other hand, is 
an example where negative spillovers can be created across jurisdictions. 
Olson (1969) suggests that ideally jurisdictions should be designed 
according to the principle of fiscal equivalence: the benefits of local services 
provided by the jurisdiction should accrue to those who pay the taxes to 
finance them, and taxes should be borne only by those who enjoy the benefits. 
When this principle is not followed, local governments generate external 
benefits or external costs across jurisdictions. To the extent that local 
governments only consider the welfare of their residents, they will ignore these 
spillovers. As a consequence, public services subject to positive spillovers will 
become undersupplied and public services producing negative spillovers will 
tend to be oversupplied. 
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The trend towards suburbanization observed in modern economies brings 
about important spillovers between the central city and suburban areas. For 
example, those agents who move to the suburbs and then commute to work at 
the central city can use the facilities in the latter without paying for the full 
burden of their provision. On the other hand, the central cities with high 
density of industrial activity are likely to pollute the environment of the 
suburbs.  
Different alternatives have been proposed in the literature to overcome 
spillover problems. The first one is related to the application of the Coase 
Theorem: given well-defined property rights, local governments have an 
incentive to internalize spillover costs and benefits through bargaining. The 
second alternative advocates for a suitable consolidation of local governments 
(Hoxby, 1996, Gilbert and Picard, 1996). However, consolidation is not 
without costs, as large communities loose the informational advantage 
available to small ones. Smaller communities can better accommodate the 
provision of public goods to the preferences of their residents and can allocate 
the costs of provision more accurately among its beneficiaries. 
 
Interregional tax competition: A crucial problem faced by local 
governments is that smaller regions are subject to significant flows of 
households, firms, and capital. The decisions of governments with respect to 
the provision of local public services and local taxes affect the locational 
choice of private households and firms. 
Regions compete to attract (mobile) households and firms by providing 
public services, with the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of their 
residents. This kind of competition may induce regional authorities to 
strategically provide certain local public goods and gain advantage over their 
competing neighbors. For example, a regional government may underprovide 
certain local public goods in order to discourage immigration of households. 
This is especially the case when new residents increase the costs of a given 
level of publicly provided services (see Pinto, 2004). Alternatively, certain 
local public goods may be overprovided in order to attract firms and, in this 
manner, increase local wages and tax revenue.  
Thus, in this context, the following questions arise: Under what conditions 
do regions supply public services in a socially efficient way when they follow 
region-specific objectives and take locational responses of mobile households 
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and firms into account? Do regions have incentives to distort the provision of 
public services in order to gain locational advantage? The literature on 
interregional tax competition addresses these issues explicitly (see Oates, 
1972, Wilson, 1986, Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, Oates and Schwab, 
1988). The crux of the problem can be explained as follows. Suppose that the 
provision of local public goods is financed by a tax on a scarce mobile factor 
such as capital. When providing the public good, the tax authority not only 
considers the costs associated with the transfer of resources from the private to 
the public sector, but also the fact that the tax base is mobile. If capital is taxed 
too much, it will leave the region, lowering local wages and tax revenues. 
From the region’s point of view, the latter is considered a cost, even though 
the tax base eventually increases tax revenues elsewhere (producing a positive 
externality). This strategic interaction will induce the tax authority in the 
region to choose a lower tax rate to avoid capital flight and may result in an 
inefficiently low supply of public goods.  
 
Tax export: Interregional tax export takes place when regions partly shift 
taxes to nonresidents. The benefits of supplying local public goods are 
internalized by the residents of a region, but the costs are partly borne by 
residents of other regions. Consequently, an inefficiently high supply of local 
public goods may result in equilibrium (see Wildasin (1987) for some 
important qualification to this general intuition). Typical examples of tax 
export are: (i) source-based taxation of land rents when land is partly owned 
by nonresidents and (ii) origin-based consumption taxes when regional 
products are also bought by nonresidents. 
 
Suburbanization 
Many metropolitan areas around the world, and particularly in the U.S., 
have been undergoing for some decades a process of “suburbanization” 
characterized by the relocation of their residents from the city-center to the 
suburbs. Initially, this relocation implied that residents still commuted to work 
to the central city. But later in the process, the decentralization of residential 
activity was followed by employment decentralization, with firms “following” 
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the population to the suburbs.9 The process of suburbanization led to the 
development of multiple employment centers, changing the whole structure of 
metropolitan areas. The new structure also gave rise to more complicated 
commuting patterns because residents no longer need to only commute to 
work to the central city.10
Urban economists provide different explanations to describe the process of 
suburbanization. On one hand, suburbanization can be regarded as “a natural 
consequence in the evolution of cities” (Mieskowski and Mills, 1993), driven, 
basically, by the following factors: 
 
• Population growth: As population expands, cities grow to spatially 
accommodate more people. 
• Higher income: Rising income increases the demand for dwelling sizes, 
which itself causes the city to expand spatially. Additionally, given that 
bigger houses can be consumed at lower cost in the suburban areas, 
residents are induced to move out of the central areas, strengthening the 
process of suburbanization. 
• Lower transportation costs: Investment in transportation infrastructure and 
other transportation innovations make travel faster and more convenient, 
reducing commuting costs. Additionally, previously remote suburban 
locations become accessible for commuters. As a result, consumers can 
have access to relatively cheap housing in the suburbs, while facing 
smaller commuting costs. Ultimately, all these factors permit the 
development of metropolitan areas at suburban locations, increasing the 
size of the urban area. 
 
Other explanations emphasize that the process of suburbanization is 
fundamentally driven by fiscal and socio-economic problems in central cities. 
These explanations are part of what is commonly known as the “flight from 
                                                 
9 The empirical evidence suggests that job suburbanization is partly a consequence rather than a 
cause of residential suburbanization (see Thurston and Yezer, 1994). 
10 In the simple model presented in section II the commuting flows were in one direction. A 
potentially interesting extension of that model would be to add further heterogeneity across 
firms and workers such that the equilibrium could involve commuting in both directions (from 
region 1 to region 2 and from region 2 to region 1). Clearly, in many situations, two-ways 
commuting is a more realistic description of the empirical outcomes. 
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blight” hypothesis. Factors such as high taxes, low quality of schools (and 
other government services), racial tensions, crimes, congestion, and low 
environmental quality, encourage certain residents to leave the cities. 
Supporters of this hypothesis claim that the negative locational attributes or 
disamenities of central cities motivate primarily higher income groups to move 
to the suburbs. Affluent households will tend to separate themselves from the 
poor, leading to the development of more homogeneous communities, and, 
consequently, to income segregation across space. In fact, as this process 
continues, the quality of life and the fiscal situation in central areas of the 
cities deteriorate even further, inducing even mo re people to move out to the 
suburbs.11,12  
Some authors regard the spatial growth of cities as excessive. According to 
this view, the size of the city is considered to be bigger than the optimal size as 
a consequence of market failures (see Brueckner, 2000). These market failures 
may arise for different reasons. Markets may not take into account the social 
value of open space when land is converted to urban use. Alternatively, 
commuters may not consider the social costs of congestion created by their use 
of the road network, leading to excessive commuting and, as a result, cities 
that are too large and widespread. Finally, real estate developers may fail to 
take into consideration the public infrastructure costs of their projects. In such 
circumstances, the cost of a given development project may appear as 
(artificially) low from a developer’s point of view, encouraging in this way 
excessive urban growth. 
A natural consequence of suburbanization is the decay of central cities. The 
residential and employment decentralization process explained before reduces 
the demand for aging central-city housing, driving prices down. As a result, 
there is less interest in upgrading and redeveloping land areas near the city 
                                                 
11 Tiebout (1956) was among the first ones to establish the fact that high-income households 
have a fiscal incentive to form homogenous communities. If households of different incomes are 
mixed together, then rich individuals will pay a higher share of the cost of public goods. They 
may also end up with lower public spending than the one that they would prefer to have, due to 
the lower willingness to pay of their lower-income neighbors. By forming their own 
jurisdictions, high-income households can lower taxes and increase the level of public good 
provision because there is no need to subsidize low-income households. 
12 Income segregation may also take place as transportation innovations develop. High-income 
groups usually move first to the suburbs because, in general, they are the first ones to have 
access to the modern and relatively more expensive means of transportation. 
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center, and big cities tend to necessarily and inevitably disappear.13 However, 
urban growth rates of many big cities in the world have remained persistently 
high. So, what explains the fact that big cities remain in place and are still 
strong?  
Many economists have used the concept of agglomeration economies to 
explain why people and firms want to stay together even after the cities lose 
many of their competitive advantages. However, Glaser and Gyourko (2005) 
adopt a different approach. They argue that the slow decline observed in some 
big cities in the U.S. can be attributed to the fact that cities essentially contain 
houses and that houses are a durable good. As cities decline, city’s house 
prices go down as well. Then, low-income people continue to live in the city 
because housing prices there tend to be less expensive than new construction 
available in the suburbs. Under this view, as long as cities are capable of 
providing inexpensive housing services, they will remain in place to attract 
those individuals that are less willing to pay for housing services. 
 
Spatial Mismatch and Borrowing Constraints 
The process of suburbanization generates a dispersal of new job 
opportunities away from the city center. However, due to different reasons, 
these opportunities are not always equally exploited by all workers. The 
“spatial mismatch” hypothesis addresses this kind of phenomenon. It has its 
origins in the study of the particular case of the U.S. economy. The hypothesis 
states that the important job growth in the suburbs combined with serious 
limitations over the feasible residential choices of low-income households 
(and, in particular, low-income African-Americans) have created a relative 
surplus of workers in inner-city areas, where most of these households live. It 
has been claimed that the main friction that prevents a natural relocation of 
households and workers is the existence of some degree of discrimination in 
the suburban housing market. This artificially restricted access to new 
locations and jobs can be part of the explanation for the weaker labor-market 
outcomes obtained by African-Americans in the U.S. labor market (the rates of 
employment and earnings of African-American workers tend to be lower). 
                                                 
13 Overexpansion, as a result of market failures, would make this problem even worse. The 
excessive increase in the supply of developed land depresses central-city prices even more, 
decreasing even further the interest for upgrading and redeveloping aging dwellings. 
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These locational restrictions can also help to explain the longer average 
commutes observed for these groups.14
In general, besides the issue of discrimination, there are many other barriers 
that prevent people from relocating their labor supply to suburban areas, 
creating a “spatial mismatch.” The existence of imperfect capital markets is 
one of the most significant barriers. It is commonly thought that individuals 
have only limited opportunities to borrow against their future labor income. 
Borrowing constraints, apart from distorting the intertemporal consumption 
profile, also affect moving decisions. People who cannot borrow will be 
restricted in terms of their capability of changing residential location. This 
means that these individuals will have limited possibilities of working in 
distant labor markets, or they will be subject to excessive commuting. 
Furthermore, the localization of labor induced by the behavior of households 
facing this kind of constraints will also have an impact on production decisions 
and profits of the affected firms.15  
 
Land Value Capitalization 
The effect that the provision of local public goods has on the value of land 
is known as capitalization. As illustrated by the model in the previous section, 
the possibility of capitalization arises mainly because of the interaction of two 
factors: (i) “the enjoyment of local public goods is coupled with land 
consumption” (Scotchmer, 2002), that is, residents can only enjoy the local 
public goods if they occupy a piece of land where the local public goods are 
provided; and (ii) households and factors of production reveal their 
preferences by moving to their desired location. Under these conditions, if a 
community raises the supply of local public goods, the community becomes 
more attractive, inducing the immigration of households and businesses. As 
this relocation takes place, the demand for land goes up, increasing land rent. 
Thus, the marginal social benefits of the public goods will be, at least partially, 
reflected in the marginal increase in land rent. If the community is very small 
                                                 
14 This hypothesis was first enunciated by John Kain in 1964 (see Kain, 1994). 
15 Pinto (2002) develops a model of “spatial mismatch” that incorporates borrowing constraints 
as a restriction over relocation behavior. 
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relative to the rest of the world, the marginal benefits will be (effectively) 
equal to the increase in the total land rent in the community.16  
The relationship between the value of land and the value of the public 
goods provided has been exploited in several different ways. For instance, it 
has been used in cost-benefit analysis to estimate the willingness to pay for 
public goods (see Rubinfeld, 1987). Additionally, many theoretical models 
have been used to argue that when choosing the level of local public goods, 
local decision makers should behave as private land developers. In other 
words, if local authorities maximize the capitalized value of land net of the 
cost of providing local public goods (which would be also the objective 
function guiding the decisions of a private land developer), then the supply of 
local public goods would be set efficiently. 
IV. The case of Greater Buenos Aires 
In this section we discuss some of the factors involved in the choice of 
where to live and where to work for individuals residing in the area of Greater 
Buenos Aires (GBA). We divide the region in two sub-regions: the City of 
Buenos Aires proper, on one side, and the 19 municipalities of the province of 
Buenos Aires (commonly known as the “conurbano”) that complete the area 
of Greater Buenos Aires, on the other side.17  
We start by describing some statistics that provide a first approximation to 
the importance of commuting in these regions. After that, we present some 
data that serves to illustrate the interaction between the commuting 
phenomenon and fiscal variables, as suggested by the model in the previous 
section. 
The City of Buenos Aires (CBA) comprises a territory of 200 Km² with 2.8 
million inhabitants. The 19 municipalities that comprise the suburbs of Buenos 
                                                 
16 Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski (1974) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) were the first 
ones to show that aggregate land rent equals total expenditure on public goods. This result is 
usually referred to as the Henry George Theorem. Polinsky and Shavell (1975) and Pines and 
Weiss (1976) showed that the marginal increase of the land rent in an open and small region 
reflects the marginal benefit of a public project. 
17 It is probably most appropriate to think of the GBA as a single urban area, in economic terms. 
While the model discussed in section II refers to the interactions between two regions, many of 
the issues that arose in that setup also surmise in a model with a city center and a periphery. 
Furthermore, to the extent that there are different jurisdictions within the GBA urban area, the 
model is a useful representation of the fiscal interactions among its jurisdictions. 
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Aires (SBA) have a surface area of around 3700 Km² and almost 8.7 millions 
inhabitants.  
Table 2 provides some general features of the population dynamics in the 
region. Between census 1914 and 1947, the rate of population growth in the 
CBA was 89%. At that time, population growth in the SBA was much higher, 
at 280%, which is also much higher than the average for the country, 102%. 
Between 1947 and 2001, the population of the CBA decreased by more than 
200 thousand inhabitants, while the population of the SBA continued to grow, 
with almost a 400% increase. In this second period, the total population of the 
country grew at 128%. The population of the CBA in 1991 was 1.8 times that 
of 1914; while this ratio was 19 for the SBA and it was 4.6 for the country as a 
whole.  
In terms of migration, between 1914 and 1947, a total of around 850 
thousand people came from other parts of the country to live in the GBA area. 
These flows represented around 5% of the total population of the country in 
1947. Table 3 provides a partial explanation of this sharp demographic 
reallocation. In particular, the area of the GBA had the highest level of 
economic capacity in the country and a relatively high provision of local 
public goods (approximated by the level of local government expenditures). 
Between 1914 and 1947, the net migration of citizens across the provinces of 
Argentina was also closely related to the economic capacity index. If we 
consider a simple regression with internal (within the country) migration as a 
percentage of the population in 1914 (data from Porto 1996), the R² of the 
regression is equal to 0.85 and the coefficient of the independent variable 
“economic capacity” is positive and significant (higher economic capacity 
implies higher immigration levels). Even if we use the absolute number of 
migrants as the dependent variable the R² is around 0.64 and the regression 
coefficient of “economic capacity” is still positive and significant. 
Migration flows continued to be important during the period between 1947 
and 1960. However, during that time only the suburbs of Buenos Aires 
attracted population (more than 1.1 million people from other parts of the 
country migrated to the SBA). The City of Buenos Aires actually exported 
population during that time, with 226 thousand people actually leaving the 
proper territory of the City of Buenos Aires (Porto 1996, Table I). 
Overall, we can say that the area of Greater Buenos Aires has been a net 
receiver of population during the last hundred years. Within this area, though, 
 
CHOOSING A PLACE TO LIVE AND A WORKPLACE 39 
significant shifts in localization decisions have been taking place. In particular, 
a pronounced suburbanization process has occurred, especially since the 
1960s. People have chosen as their place to live the outskirts of the city, that 
is, the area we have labeled (broadly defined) as the suburbs of Buenos Aires 
(SBA). 
The geographic proximity between the two regions is an important factor 
that makes possible the existence of a large number of people living in one 
region and working in the other. Recent data from two census conducted in 
1991 and 1994 confirm the existence of a significant amount of commuting 
within the two regions. In Table 4 we present data that indicates that, in 1994, 
the CBA had a net demand for labor (i.e., an excess demand) of around 1.1 
million workers, which is 45% of its total labor force. Tables 5 and 6 present 
data on labor market conditions in the two regions. As suggested by the model 
in section II, the CBA, which is the net receiver of commuting workers, has on 
average higher wages. This is so even though, as the model indicates, the 
existence of commuters is likely to contribute to reduce wages in the CBA and 
increase them in the SBA.18
Another interesting issue is the effect of commuting over the budget of 
local governments. According to the model in section II, opening the 
possibility of commuting implies that the population of region 1 grows and the 
population of region 2 decreases (see the description of the transition 
scenario). To appreciate the potential quantitative significance of this kind of 
phenomenon we undertake the following thought experiment. Assume that the 
possibilities of commuting are (exogenously) reduced, such that one of every 
two agents that live in the SBA and work in the CBA decides to move to the 
CBA. Also assume that each of the moving workers has a standard family (a 
partner and two children), and that the (moving) families originally had access 
to local public goods in the SBA and pay taxes there, at the average level. 
Under this scenario, the resulting migration would cause a decrease in 
government expenditures in the SBA of 1,040 million pesos and a decrease of 
566 million pesos in total tax receipts; this would derive in 474 million pesos 
of net savings for the sub-national (i.e., provincial and municipal) governments 
of the SBA. 
                                                 
18 If the possibility of commuting were shut down, the immediate impact would be a reduction 
in the labor supply in CBA of around 45%; even with a high labor demand elasticity (e.g. 1.5) 
the increment of wages would be very important (around 30%). 
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As we said before, differences across regions in (i) fiscal variables, like 
local taxes and the level of provision of local public goods and infrastructure, 
and (ii) non-fiscal variables, like productive capacity and stock of productive 
factors, determine the importance of the commuting phenomenon. Tables 7 
and 8 present some data that suggest that these differences across regions are 
significant in the area of Grater Buenos Aires.19  
People living in different regions of the GBA area have access to very 
different levels of provision of local public goods. Per capita government 
expenditure in the CBA is almost 26% higher than the average for the SBA 
(including provincial and municipal expenditures; see Table 8). It is important 
to mention that per capita government expenditure is lower in the SBA, the 
relatively poorer region, even though it would be reasonable to expect that 
poor households tend to consume more intensively local public goods and that 
the cost of provision of these public goods is likely to be much higher in poor 
areas. Several indicators suggest that this kind of considerations might be of 
significant quantitative relevance. In particular, note that: (i) the percentage of 
people under the poverty line is 5.9% in the CBA and 30.5% in the SBA; (ii) 
the Development Index is 100 for the CBA and 62 for the SBA; (iii) the 
percentage of homes with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) is 7.1% in the CBA 
and 14.5% in the SBA; and (iv) the percentage of people with no health 
insurance is 26% in the CBA and 52% in the SBA (a proxy for public hospital 
usage).  
Notably, the tax pressure is actually higher in the province of Buenos Aires 
(PBA) (5.4% in the PBA and 4.4% in the CBA). This difference in fiscal 
variables arises in part from the disparity in GDP per capita (200% higher in 
the CBA than in the PBA) and the disparity in the relationship between median 
income and the poverty line (3.5 in the CBA and 1.4 in the SBA).  
The PBA uses relatively less inputs in the provision of public goods than 
the CBA (19% less government employment as a percentage of the 
population), and the PBA pays lower remuneration to the inputs that it uses 
(around 15%). These two measures may be taken as indicative of the fact that 
the PBA is likely to be providing public goods of lower quality (than those 
available in the CBA). 
                                                 
19 The data in Table 7 compares the CBA with the whole province of Buenos Aires (not just the 
SBA). 
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As we said, Table 7 shows important differences in the level of provision of 
local public goods across regions. This data then suggests that fiscal factors 
may be playing an important role in creating differences over labor 
productivity across regions. Table 8 provides some measures of the relative 
productivity of workers and the level of government expenditures in each 
region, and the last row of Table 7 provides a measure of the regions’ relative 
availability of productive capital.  
The data presented above suggests that localization decisions and the 
phenomenon of commuting between the CBA and the SBA is of mayor 
quantitative importance and is influenced by, and influences the determination 
of fiscal and non-fiscal variables. Our contribution is only to provide a first, 
introductory step that shows how essential would be to further study these 
matters, both in their theoretical and empirical aspects.  
In the National Constitution Reform of 1994 the City of Buenos Aires 
changed its institutional status from Federal District (dependent of the 
National Government) to a municipality with an autonomous government. The 
new status of the CBA gives special relevance to the subject studied in this 
paper. According to the 1994 Constitution, the municipality of Buenos Aires 
now participates in the federal regime of tax-revenue sharing – by which the 
provinces and the City of Buenos Aires receive tax revenues collected by the 
federal government, for a value of around 5% of the GNP. This change in the 
legal status of the CBA created several interesting, and still unanswered, 
questions. For example, it would be useful to evaluate how much of the extra 
fiscal resources assigned to the CBA under the new revenue sharing rules have 
derived in a mere increase in the rent of urban land. 
V. Conclusions 
In general, there is a tendency for agents to live and work in the same 
community. This concentration of activities in one area is mainly due to the 
existence of commuting costs (consider in a broad sense). Nevertheless, when 
there exists heterogeneity across regions, either in terms of labor return or in 
terms of the comfort that the region provides as a place to live, flows of 
workers from one community to the other may arise.  
In the simple model presented in Section II is able to generate commuting 
flows across regions; in particular, there is a region that ‘exports’ workers and 
another that ‘receives’ them. The flow of workers (commuters) takes place up 
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to the point where wages in the ‘exporting’ region (the one with relatively low 
productivity of labor) equal wages in the ‘receiving’ region, net of commuting 
costs.  
In the model, a decrease in commuting costs not only increases the number 
of workers and commuters, but also reduces the number of agents living in the 
region with the relatively high wages. Improvements of the (productive) 
infrastructure in a region tend to increase the number of agents working in that 
region. The (indirect) effect of infrastructure over the number of residents is 
less obvious. In fact, no matter which region improves its infrastructure, the 
population of the region with the (relatively) low wages increases.  
The level of provision of local public goods (that is, public goods that 
benefit the agents that live in a specific region) does not play a role in the 
determination of the distribution of workers across regions (in the model) but 
determines the distribution of residents across regions. In consequence, by 
increasing the provision of local public goods a region can attract new 
residents to its area.  
The model presented in section II is very simple and it abstracts from many 
important aspects that influence the localization decisions of economic agents. 
For completeness, section III provided an overview of the main issues not 
formally introduced in the model, together with a discussion of the current 
treatment of these issues in the existing (urban economics) literature.  
In section IV we discussed some possible determinants of the distribution 
of households and workers in the area of the Greater Buenos Aires, in 
Argentina. The Greater Buenos Aires area occupies 0.14% of the total territory 
of the country. Yet, in this relatively small area live 32% of Argentina’s 
population (2001 census). The fiscal variables and the commuting 
phenomenon seem to play an important role in localization decisions and 
appear to have large quantitative relevance. 
To conclude, we strongly believe that the fiscal interactions and 
localization patterns between the City of Buenos Aires and its suburban areas 
deserve much more careful attention by political and academic forums. Our 
paper is just a suggestive first step intended to push further thinking in this 
direction. 
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Table 1 
Comparative Static Results 
Summary 
Parameters l1* l2* n* 
G1 + (–) + 
G2 (–) + + 
G1 n.c. n.c. + 
G2 n.c. n.c. (–) 
s + (–) (–) 
p n.c. n.c. + 
Note: We indicate with a + sign those comparative statics that are positive, 
with (–) those comparative statics that are negative, and with “n.c.” those 
that result in no change. 
 
 
Table 2 
Inter-census Evolution of Population. City of Buenos Aires (CBA) and  
Suburbs of Buenos Aires (SBA), 1914-1991  
(thousands of people) 
Census CBA  SBA Total (country) 
(CBA + 
SBA)/Total  
(%) 
1914 1575.8 458.0 7885.2 25.8 
1947 2981.0 1741.3 15893.8 29.7 
1960 2966.6 3772.4 20013.8 33.8 
1970 2972.5 5380.4 23364.4 35.7 
1980 2922.8 6843.2 27949.5 34.9 
1991 2961.0 7950.4 32608.7 33.5 
2001 2768.7 8684.4 36223.9 31.6 
Source: Censos Nacionales de Población. 
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Table 3 
Jurisdictions 
Economic 
Capacity  
in 1937  
(PBA+CBA=100) 
Provincial Gov. 
Expenditures per 
Capita  
in 1934 (pesos 
1960) 
Prov. of Buenos Aires 96.4 18.3 
City of Buenos Aires 106.3 21.1 
Catamarca 9.6 3.1 
Córdoba 68.7 11.6 
Corrientes 21.6 6.4 
Entre Ríos 45.1 12.4 
Jujuy 44.6 13.2 
La Rioja 12.2 4.6 
Mendoza 62.2 26.7 
Salta 40.1 9.05 
Santa Fe 75.3 14.2 
San Juan 32.7 33.5 
San Luis 18.2 9.5 
Santiago del Estero 9.8 6.9 
Tucumán 40.4 12.7 
Promedio 73.9 16.3 
Source: Bunge, A. (1940) and Porto, A. (1990). 
 
 
Table 4 
Employment and Net Labor Demand in the CBA 
Description Employment Estimation CBA (Thousands) 
Total of Working Positions 2402 
Working Population 1324 
Excess Demand 1078 
Source: Convenio FCE.UNLP - ME.PBA, Nov. 1996. 
Data: Censos de Población (1991) y Económico (1994).
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Table 5 
Labor Market Indicators, City of Buenos Aires (CBA) and Suburbs 
(SBA) 
Permanent Household Survey (EPH-C), second semester 2005 
Males between 25 and 55 years of age. 2005 Pesos 
 CBA SBA Ratio 
Years of education 13.1 9.7 1.4 
Hourly wage, main occupation    
 Total 10.1 5.4 1.9 
 Non-skilled 4.2 4.0 1.1 
 Semi-skilled 6.8 4.9 1.4 
 Skilled 14.4 10.0 1.4 
Total number of hours worked    
 Total 43.9 42.5 1.0 
 Non-skilled 42.7 39.9 1.1 
 Semi-skilled 45.6 45.5 1.0 
 Skilled 43.1 43.2 1.0 
Labor income    
 Total 1738.9 857.3 2.0 
 Non-skilled  726.5 599.5 1.2 
 Semi-skilled 1137.5 871.8 1.3 
 Skilled 2503.4 1573.3 1.6 
Household income per capita    
 Total 1127.1 488.7 2.3 
 Non-skilled 459.6 315.2 1.5 
 Semi-skilled 778.0 476.0 1.6 
 Skilled 1596.6 1020.0 1.6 
Source: CEDLAS – Departamento de Economía – UNLP. 
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Table 6 
Hourly wages (by sector), 1998 Pesos or U$S 
 CBA SBA 
Food, drinks and tobacco  2.973 2.345 
Textiles and shoes  4.059 2.104 
Chemicals 10.816 3.347 
Electricity, natural gas, and water 9.160 5.502 
Construction 3.969 2.198 
Wholesale (Comercio al por mayor) 5.324 3.299 
Retail (Comercio minorista) 2.821 1.850 
Restaurants and hotels 2.601 1.919 
Source: CEDLAS – Departamento de Economía – UNLP. 
 
 
Table 7 
Comparative Indicators, City of Buenos Aires (CBA) and Province of 
Buenos Aires (PBA) 
 CBA PBA 
Population 2001 (thousand) 2,768.7 13,818.7 
% Change in Population, 2001/1991 -6.5 9.9 
% of Urban Population (2001) 100.0 96.0 
Own Fiscal Resources (2004)   
Per Capita (US$ 2004) 496 202 
Over GNP (%) 4.4 5.4 
GNP per Capita (US$ 2004) 11,118 3,706 
Gov. Expenditures per Capita (US$ 2004) 482 345 
Gov. Employment / Population (%) 3.7 3.0 
Public Wages, Annual Average (US$ 2004) 471 403 
Development Index 2001 (CBA = 100) 100 62 
% of Homes with UBN (2001) 7.1 14.5 
Stock of Capital 1996 (Per Capita, CBA = 100) 100 68 
Source: Departamento de Economía – UNLP. 
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Table 8 
Comparative Indicators CBA and SBA 
 CBA SBA 
1. People under the poverty line in 1998 (% of total 
population) 
5.9 30.5 
2. Median income / poverty line income 3.5 1.4 
3. Government expenditures (provincial and municipal),  
 per capita (U$S 2004) 
482 384 
4. Percentage of population with no health insurance in 
2001 
26.2 52.0 
5. Value added (per worker). Economic census 1994. 
CBA = 100 
  
5. 1. Manufacture 100 97 
5. 2. Commercial activities 100 39 
5. 3. Services 100 55 
Source: CEDLAS – Departamento de Economía – UNLP, and INDEC. 
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RESUMEN 
 
 
Clasificación JEL: J61, R12, H3, H41, H54, H7. 
En este trabajo se estudia como la política fiscal y los costos de transporte 
determinan la distribución geográfica de los trabajadores y  las familias.  Se 
utiliza un modelo simple de dos regiones con costos de transporte, bienes 
públicos locales e infraestructura local.  Se presenta una breve revisión de 
literatura relacionada que estudia otros factores determinantes de la 
localización de los agentes.  Se argumenta que las cuestiones estudiadas 
juegan un rol importante en la distribución geográfica de la actividad 
económica en el área urbana del Gran Buenos Aires. 
Palabras claves: costos de transporte, bienes públicos locales, infraestructura 
local, suburbanización. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
Classification JEL: J61, R12, H3, H41, H54, H7. 
We study how fiscal policies and commuting costs determine the geographical 
distribution of workers and households in an economy. We characterize 
equilibrium outcomes in a simple two-region model with commuting costs, 
local public goods, and local infrastructure. We also provide a short survey of 
the related economic literature that discusses other important factors driving 
the localization decisions of agents. Finally, we argue that the issues raise in 
this paper play a significant role in the geographic distribution of economic 
activity in the Greater Buenos Aires urban area of Argentina. 
Keywords: Commuting, local public goods, suburbanization, local 
infrastructure. 
 
 
